期刊
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
卷 56, 期 -, 页码 122-134出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.10.003
关键词
Model organisms; Human embryonic stem cells; Representation; Generalization; Extrapolation; Modeling
资金
- Rice University's Faculty Innovation Fund
- Division of Humanities (Rice University)
- Mosle Foundation
- National Science Foundation [1354515]
- Department of Philosophy at the University of Utah
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [1354515] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Model organisms are at once scientific models and concrete living things. It is widely assumed by philosophers of science that (1) model organisms function much like other kinds of models, and (2) that insofar as their scientific role is distinctive, it is in virtue of representing a wide range of biological species and providing a basis for generalizations about those targets. This paper uses the case of human embryonic stem cells (hESC) to challenge both assumptions. I first argue that hESC can be considered model organisms, analogous to classic examples such as Escherichia coli and Drosophila melanogaster. I then discuss four contrasts between the epistemic role of hESC in practice, and the assumptions about model organisms noted above. These contrasts motivate an alternative view of model organisms as a network of systems related constructively and developmentally to one another. I conclude by relating this result to other accounts of model organisms in recent philosophy of science. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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