期刊
NEW JOURNAL OF PHYSICS
卷 18, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
IOP PUBLISHING LTD
DOI: 10.1088/1367-2630/18/6/065008
关键词
quantum key distribution; device-independent quantum key distribution; quantum communication; security analysis; information leakage; Trojan horse attacks
资金
- Galician Regional Government (program 'Ayudas para proyectos de investigacion desarrollados por investigadores emergentes') [EM2014/033]
- Galician Regional Government (consolidation of Research Units: AtlantTIC)
- Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO)
- Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER) [TEC2014-54898-R]
- ImPACT Program of the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan)
- project EMPIR [14IND05 MIQC2]
- EMPIR programme
- European Unions Horizon research and innovation programme
In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.
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