On the Proper Treatment of Dynamics in Cognitive Science

This essay examines the relevance of dynamical ideas for cognitive science. On its own, the mere mathematical idea of a dynamical system is too weak to serve as a scientific theory of anything, and dynamical approaches within cognitive science are too rich and varied to be subsumed under a single dynamical hypothesis. Instead, after first attempting to dissect the different notions of dynamics and cognition at play, a more specific theoretical framework for cognitive science broadly construed is sketched. This framework draws upon not only dynamical ideas, but also such contemporaneous perspectives as situatedness, embodiment, ecological psychology, enaction, neuroethology/neuroscience, artificial life, and biogenic approaches. The paper ends with some methodological suggestions for pursuing this theoretical framework.

Automated summary

This essay explores the relevance of dynamical ideas for cognitive science. The mathematical idea of a dynamical system alone is insufficient as a scientific theory, and the various dynamical approaches within cognitive science cannot be encompassed by a single hypothesis. Instead, the essay proposes a specific theoretical framework that incorporates dynamical ideas along with other perspectives such as situatedness, embodiment, ecological psychology, enaction, neuroethology/neuroscience, artificial life, and biogenic approaches. The paper concludes with methodological suggestions for advancing this theoretical framework.