The Dynamicist Landscape

The dynamical hypothesis states that cognitive systems are dynamical systems. While dynamical systems play an important role in many cognitive phenomena, the dynamical hypothesis as stated applies to every system and so fails both to specify what makes cognitive systems distinct and to distinguish between proposals regarding the nature of cognitive systems. To avoid this problem, I distinguish several different types of dynamical systems, outlining four dimensions along which dynamical systems can vary: total-state versus partial-state, internal versus external, macroscopic versus microscopic, and systemic versus componential, and illustrate these with examples. I conclude with two illustrations of partial-state, internal, microscopic, componential dynamicism. The dynamical hypothesis formulated by van Gelder states that cognitive systems are dynamical systems. Understanding precisely what kind of dynamical system, however, remains an open question. In this article, Barack outlines a range of types of dynamical system by distinguishing four different dimensions along which those systems can vary, laying the groundwork for investigating the relationship between different types of dynamics and cognitive phenomena.

Automated summary

This article discusses the dynamical hypothesis and the importance of dynamical systems in cognitive science. By differentiating different types of dynamical systems, the author lays the groundwork for investigating the relationship between dynamics and cognitive phenomena.