☆ 4.2 Article

A new impossibility result for random assignments

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS (2023)

期刊

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

卷 107, 期 -, 页码 -

出版社

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102850

关键词

Random assignment problem; Robust ex-post pareto efficiency; Weak envy-freeness

类别

Economics Mathematics, Interdisciplinary Applications Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Protocol

Reagent

智能总结 New
摘要

We show that ex-post Pareto efficiency is possible with strategy-proofness and weak envy-freeness, and that ordinal efficiency is not compatible with them. We further demonstrate this impossibility for random assignments and find that it holds even when ordinal efficiency is weakened to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency. An assignment is considered robust ex-post Pareto efficient if all deterministic assignments in its support are Pareto efficient.

We know that ex-post Pareto efficiency is possible with strategy-proofness and weak envy-freeness while ordinally efficiency is incompatible with them. We strengthen this impossibility for random assignments and show that it prevails if ordinal efficiency is weakened to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency , an intermediate notion of efficiency weaker than ordinal efficiency and stronger than ex -post Pareto efficiency. An assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for all of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

作者

我是这篇论文的作者

点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.2

评分不足

次要评分

新颖性

-

重要性

-

科学严谨性

-

评价这篇论文

推荐

Article Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence

Fair in the Eyes of Others

Parham Shams Parham, Aurelie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Nicolas Maudet

Summary: Envy-freeness is a widely studied notion in resource allocation that captures aspects of fairness. This study introduces the notion of approval envy as a proxy for objectivity and explores its relationship with proportionality. The findings provide insights into tractable cases and efficient methods for computing approvals, suggesting its frequent occurrence in resource allocation.

JOURNAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH (2022)

添加到收藏夹

Article Automation & Control Systems

Fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores

Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Ayumi Igarashi, Toby Walsh

Summary: This paper discusses the problem of fairly dividing indivisible items and extends it to a more general scenario where agents may have positive or negative utility for each item. It explores the applicability of certain positive axiomatic and computational results in this general setting and presents several efficient algorithms for fair allocations. The paper also identifies gaps in the literature regarding the existence of allocations that satisfy specific fairness and efficiency properties and examines the complexity of computing such allocations.

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS (2022)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment

Christian Basteck, Lars Ehlers

Summary: This study examines the random assignment of indivisible objects among agents with strict preferences. It proves that there is no mechanism that can be unanimous, strategy-proof, and envy-free. However, a mechanism that satisfies strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and ex-post weak non-wastefulness can be q-unanimous for q<=n^2. The study also introduces a new mechanism, RDcED, which achieves the maximal bound when all objects are acceptable.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (2023)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation

Priyanka Shende, Manish Purohit

Summary: This paper investigates the allocation of indivisible objects to agents when they have strict preferences. It explores the trade-offs between efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness in allocation mechanisms. The paper introduces a new family of mechanisms called Rank Exchange mechanisms that are both strategy-proof and envy-free, and are more efficient than equal division.

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY (2023)

添加到收藏夹

Article Operations Research & Management Science

Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure

Yajing Chen, Zhenhua Jiao, Wen Qin, Jinghong Shan

Summary: In this study, we investigate the envy-freeness and ordinal efficiency of the random serial dictatorship (RSD) rule on preference domains with a tier structure. It is found that the RSD rule is envy-free on restricted tier preference domains, but the almost-singleton condition is not sufficient for the RSD rule to be ordinally efficient. Furthermore, the condition under which the RSD rule is ordinally efficient for assignment problems on the restricted tier preference domains is characterized.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS (2023)

添加到收藏夹

Article Management

A pessimist?s approach to one-sided matching

Tom Demeulemeester, Dries Goossens, Ben Hermans, Roel Leus

Summary: This research investigates the one-sided matching problem where agents have preferences over objects but objects do not have preferences over agents. By decomposing probabilistic assignments, the researchers find the theoretically best worst-case number of assigned agents and propose two alternative column generation frameworks to achieve this decomposition.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH (2023)

添加到收藏夹

Article Computer Science, Information Systems

The envy-free matching problem with pairwise preferences

Naoyuki Kamiyama

Summary: The paper explores envy-free matching when each agent has preferences, and it is generally hard to check the existence of an envy-free matching in situations where preferences are defined based on comparisons of acceptable items between agents.

INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS (2021)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results

Rasoul Ramezanian, Mehdi Feizi

Summary: This paper investigates the efficiency properties of random assignment and finds that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency. It also points out that strategy-proof and ordinal efficient mechanisms fail to satisfy both equal treatment of equals and equal division lower bound, and that it is not possible to avoid these impossibilities by weakening ordinal efficiency to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency.

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (2022)

添加到收藏夹

Article Operations Research & Management Science

On the complexity of fair house allocation

Naoyuki Kamiyama, Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong

Summary: The study reveals that maximizing the number of envy-free agents in house allocation is hard to approximate within a factor of n(1-gamma) for any constant gamma > 0. The exact version is also NP-hard, even for binary utilities. Additionally, determining the existence of a proportional allocation is computationally hard, while the problem of equitability can be solved efficiently.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS (2021)

添加到收藏夹

Article Management

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing

Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi

Summary: This paper investigates how to fairly allocate a collection of objects among agents with different tastes. If the objects cannot be shared, a fair division may not exist. The authors propose that, in general, a fair fractionally Pareto-optimal division with the smallest possible number of shared objects can be found.

OPERATIONS RESEARCH (2022)

添加到收藏夹

Article Automation & Control Systems

Probabilistic serial mechanism for multi-type resource allocation

Xiaoxi Guo, Sujoy Sikdar, Haibin Wang, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, Hanpin Wang

Summary: This paper investigates multi-type resource allocation problems and provides a series of conclusions about mechanism design based on analysis of agents with different preferences. For indivisible items, the LexiPS mechanism is proposed to address efficiency and envy-freeness issues. For divisible items, it is demonstrated that the existing multi-type probabilistic serial mechanism excels in lexicon-efficiency and strategic issues under different types of preferences.

AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS (2021)

添加到收藏夹

Article Automation & Control Systems

A Robust Control Approach to AMSs by Using the Implementation of Strong and Weak Robustness

Xiaojun Wang, Hesuan Hu

Summary: In automated manufacturing systems, it is crucial to ensure the completion of all essential products. The smooth operation of a system with shared and dedicated resources is necessary for this. The article classifies systems with unreliable resources into three types and proposes a robust control method based on this classification.

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN CYBERNETICS-SYSTEMS (2023)

添加到收藏夹

Article Management

Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare

Peter Biro, Jens Gudmundsson

Summary: This paper discusses the allocation of objects to agents, encoding welfare judgments as edge weights in an acceptability graph, introducing a constrained welfare-maximizing solution, and briefly discussing incentives for reporting preferences truthfully.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH (2021)

添加到收藏夹

Article Computer Science, Hardware & Architecture

Envy-Free Resource Sharing on a Temporal Network Using a Minimum Cost Circulation Problem

Ryo Hase, Mitsue Imahori, Norihiko Shinomiya

Summary: The development of the sharing economy has changed the relationships between producers and consumers. Promoting resource sharing can help address environmental issues, and achieving envy-freeness is crucial in ensuring fairness in resource sharing processes.

IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES (2021)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization

Yajing Chen, Patrick Harless, Zhenhua Jiao

Summary: This study analyzes the fractional Boston rule, a generalization of the classical Boston rule, for random assignment based on ordinal preferences of agents. Two new axioms, stochastic dominance rank efficiency and equal-rank envy-freeness, are introduced to characterize the fairness and efficiency of the fractional Boston rule. Stochastic dominance rank efficiency implies ordinal efficiency, while equal-rank envy-freeness ensures equal treatment of equals.

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN (2023)

添加到收藏夹

暂无数据

Article Economics

Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests

Stefano Barbieri, Iryna Topolyan

Summary: In this paper, we explore public randomization in group contests and introduce group public randomization equilibria (GPRE). We find that although there are multiple equilibria, refining the selection process to GPRE immune to coalitional deviations results in a unique equilibrium group-effort distribution, which has the highest expected total effort among all equilibria for identical groups composed of identical agents.

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS (2024)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

Asset bubble and growth: Elastic labor supply with fiscal policy

Kathia Bahloul Zekkari

Summary: This paper examines the interaction between asset bubbles and endogenous growth, demonstrating the positive impact of asset bubbles on economic growth. Furthermore, it finds that under certain fiscal parameters, asset bubbles can enhance welfare.

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS (2024)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

Cautious belief and iterated admissibility

Emiliano Catonini, Nicodemo De Vito

Summary: We define notions of cautiousness and cautious belief to provide epistemic conditions for iterated admissibility in finite games. The behavioral implications of these epistemic assumptions are characterized by the solution concept of self-admissible set. We also show analogous results under alternative epistemic assumptions.

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS (2024)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

Cost allocation in energy distribution networks

David Lowing

Summary: This paper investigates the cost allocation problem in energy distribution and proposes cost allocation rules based on the distribution network and consumer demands. By comparing different principles, a family of mixed rules is introduced and analyzed in terms of solution concepts in multi-choice games.

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS (2024)

添加到收藏夹

Article Economics

A menu dependent Luce model with a numeraire

John Rehbeck

Summary: This paper proposes a simple extension to analyze the impact of menu complexity on alternative choices and characterizes its mathematical properties. The research shows that, in some cases, people are more likely to choose the default option as the menu size increases. Furthermore, the study relates this model to the class of perturbed utility models.

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS (2024)

添加到收藏夹

© Peeref 2019-2024. All rights reserved.