期刊
OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
卷 115, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2022.102781
关键词
Equilibrium efficient frontier; Non-oriented DEA measure; Fixed-sum outputs; Nash Bargaining game
This paper proposes a new non-oriented EEFDEA approach to assess the efficiency of decision-making units by capturing input excesses and output shortfalls simultaneously. A bargaining-based selection method is also presented to deal with multiple feasible EEFs. The method can generate a unique and Pareto-optimal EEF.
Equilibrium efficient frontier DEA (EEFDEA) approaches have been developed specifically for the efficiency assessment of decision-making units (DMUs) with fixed-sum outputs in recent years. Still, current EEFDEA approaches can only evaluate either input- or output-oriented efficiency. This paper proposes a new non-oriented EEFDEA (NEEFDEA) approach, which measures efficiency by capturing input excesses and output shortfalls simultaneously. However, the NEEFDEA approach also encounters the difficulty of guaranteeing the uniqueness of the common equilibrium efficient frontier (EEF). To address the problem, we further present a new bargaining-based selection method to deal with multiple feasible EEFs. By regarding DMUs as game players to seek to optimize their own evaluation results, the screening process of EEFs is formulated as a bargaining game, it can generate a unique and Pareto-optimal EEF by solving the game. Such an EEF is essential to bring all DMUs to a consensus on the final evaluation results. Finally, to present the performance of our model, we apply the proposed approaches to conduct an empirical study of 30 companies in the vehicle industry in 2020. (C) 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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