Cognitive Variation: The Philosophical Landscape

We do not all make choices, reason, interpret our experience, or respond to our environment in the same way. A recent surge of scientific interest has thrust these individual differences into the spotlight: researchers in cognitive psychology and neuroscience are now devoting increasing attention to cognitive variation. The philosophical dimensions of this research, however, have yet to be systematically explored. Here I make an initial foray by considering how cognitive variation is characterized. I present a central dilemma facing descriptions of individual differences, discuss several distinctions used to categorize variation, and show that these distinctions require further elaboration. Finally, by canvassing several philosophical topics for which the characterization of cognitive variation may have significant implications, I argue that philosophers should take note of how and why our minds differ.

Automated summary

We all have individual differences in making choices, reasoning, interpreting experiences, and responding to the environment. Recent scientific interest in cognitive psychology and neuroscience has brought these differences into focus. However, the philosophical implications of this research have not been systematically explored. This paper examines how cognitive variation is characterized, discusses different ways of categorizing these variations, and argues for the importance of understanding and studying the differences in our minds for philosophy.