Can we wrong a robot?

With the development of increasingly sophisticated sociable robots, robot-human relationships are being transformed. Not only can sociable robots furnish emotional support and companionship for humans, humans can also form relationships with robots that they value highly. It is natural to ask, do robots that stand in close relationships with us have any moral standing over and above their purely instrumental value as means to human ends. We might ask our question this way, 'Are there ways we can act towards robots that would be wrong to the robot?' To address this, Part I lays out standard approaches to moral standing: appealing to intrinsic properties, human responses, and values inhering in relationships. Part II explores the third, relational strategy in detail. Looking beyond Western analyses, it considers Eastern philosophy and the environmental philosophy of 'deep ecology' and extends these approaches to sociable robots. Part III examines practical implications for the case of Samantha, a sex robot that was allegedly raped. Part IV identifies and replies to objections.

Automated summary

With the increasing development of sociable robots, the relationship between robots and humans is undergoing transformation. Humans can now form close relationships with robots, receiving emotional support and companionship. This raises the question of the moral standing of robots and whether our actions towards them can be considered wrong. This article explores different approaches to determining moral standing and examines the practical implications of robot-human relationships.