期刊
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 527, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2021.110818
关键词
Evolutionary dynamics; Stochastic games; Environmental feedback
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [NSFC 62036002]
- PKU-Baidu Fund [2020BD017]
- Simons Foundation Math+X Grant
In a population of interacting individuals, the interplay between the environment and individuals' behaviors influences evolutionary outcomes. State-dependent strategies can outperform state-independent strategies in well-mixed or structured populations when the environment changes slower than behaviors, leading to increased cooperation levels with fast environment switching.
In a population of interacting individuals, the environment for interactions often changes due to individuals' behaviors, which in turn drive the evolution of individuals' behaviors. The interplay between the environment and individuals' behaviors has been demonstrated to remarkably influence the evolutionary outcomes. In reality, in highly cognitive species such as social primates and human beings, individuals are often capable of perceiving the environment change and then differentiate their strategies across different environment states. We propose a model of environmental feedback with state-dependent strategies: individuals have perceptions of distinct environment states and therefore take distinct sub-strategies under each of them; based on the sub-strategy, individuals then decide their behaviors; their behaviors subsequently modify the environment state. We use the theory of stochastic games and evolutionary dynamics to analyze this idea. We find that when environment changes slower than behaviors, state-dependent strategies (i.e. taking different sub-strategies under different environment states) can outperform state-independent strategies (i.e. taking an identical sub-strategy under all environment states), such as Win-Stay, Lose-Shift, the most leading strategy among state-independent strategies. The intuition is that delayed environmental feedback provides chances for individuals with state-dependent strategies to exploit those with state-independent strategies. Our results hold (1) in both well-mixed and structured populations; (2) when the environment switches between two or more states. Furthermore, the environment changing rate decides if state-dependent strategies benefit global cooperation. The evolution sees the rise of the cooperation level for fast environment switching and the decrease otherwise. Our work stresses that individuals' perceptions of different environment states are beneficial to their survival and social prosperity in a changing world. (C) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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