What are the roles of consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government in the process of banning gasoline vehicles? Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model

To alleviate the pressure on energy and the environment, and promote the upgrading of automobile industry, it is imperative to ban the sale of gasoline vehicles. Therefore, based on co-evolutionary game theory, we considered consumers, automobile production enterprises, and the government involved in banning gasoline vehicles. The main results are as follows. (1) When the potential benefits of enterprises selling gasoline vehicles exceeded the potential penalties, and the potential benefits of positive super-vision for the government was less than the potential benefits of negative supervision, the policy of banning gasoline vehicles became invalid. (2) When the utility of non-gasoline vehicles (NGVs) was higher than the penalty for violations, the producers' excess revenue exceeded the research and development (R&D) investment in NGVs, and the excess incentive of the government was less than the cost of positive supervision, the system eventually reached the ideal evolutionary equilibrium status. (3) Changes in factors such as media exposure, the utility of NGVs, R&D investments, technical subsidies, and double integral prices affected the speed that the system moved toward an ideal equilibrium strategy. Our findings have significant implications for how to banning gasoline vehicles, which can guarantee the implementation effect of this policy. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

The study shows under the policy of banning gasoline vehicles, when the potential benefits of enterprises exceed potential penalties and negative supervision by the government is greater than positive supervision, the policy will be ineffective; however, when the utility of NGVs is higher than penalties for violations, producer's income exceeds R&D investment, and government incentives are lower than supervision costs, the system will reach an ideal equilibrium state.