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Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief

期刊

COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY
卷 26, 期 4, 页码 213-230

出版社

ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016

关键词

Delusion; two-factor theory; abduction; Charles Sanders Peirce; bias against disconfirmatory evidence

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The study proposes an eight-step model to explain the formation of delusional belief, with a specific failure in one of the steps leading to the development of delusions. The model is based on Peircean abductive inference, illustrating how unexpected observations can influence the formation of new beliefs.
Introduction: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. Consciousness and Cognition, 87, 103037. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce. Methods: In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief. Results: We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence. Conclusions: In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.

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