Intellectual humility in mathematics

In this paper I explore how intellectual humility manifests in mathematical practices. To do this I employ accounts of this virtue as developed by virtue epistemologists in three case studies of mathematical activity. As a contribution to a Topical Collection on virtue theory of mathematical practices this paper explores in how far existing virtue-theoretic frameworks can be applied to a philosophical analysis of mathematical practices. I argue that the individual accounts of intellectual humility are successful at tracking some manifestations of this virtue in mathematical practices and fail to track others. There are two upshots to this. First, the accounts of the intellectual virtues provided by virtue epistemologists are insightful for the development of a virtue theory of mathematical practices but require adjustments in some cases. Second, the case studies reveal dimensions of intellectual humility virtue epistemologists have thus far overlooked in their theoretical reflections.

Automated summary

This paper examines how intellectual humility manifests in mathematical practices using accounts developed by virtue epistemologists. While these accounts are insightful, adjustments may be needed for the development of a virtue theory of mathematical practices. Additionally, case studies reveal dimensions of intellectual humility that virtue epistemologists have overlooked in their theoretical reflections.