Game Theoretical Approach to Novel Reactive Power Ancillary Service Market Mechanism

In deregulated power systems, reactive power ancillary service through electricity market is becoming relevant where private generation companies participate in maintaining system wide bus voltage within the permissible limits. Marginal cost price (MCP) based real time reactive power ancillary service market faces several challenges due to the localized nature of reactive power. In this paper, a market mechanism for real time reactive power ancillary service market based on Stackelberg game model is proposed considering voltage-apparent power coupled subsystems. In the proposed Stackelberg game model, Independent System Operator (ISO) is considered as the leader, and GENCOs as followers. In the formulation, each GENCO is associated with a relevance factor in the partitioned subsystem so as to consider the real time voltage support requirement in the system. The market is then formulated as Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints problem (MPEC). Existence of equilibrium, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality of the proposed market mechanism is then analysed in this work. The numerical examples are illustrated in PJM 5-bus system, and tested on IEEE 30- bus system, and Nordic 32 Bus-system. The mechanism induces truth-telling behavior of GENCOs, yields a non-negative profit, and the system wide bus voltage is improved.

Automated summary

This paper proposes a market mechanism for real-time reactive power ancillary services based on the Stackelberg game model, considering voltage-apparent power coupled subsystems. The mechanism is tested on different systems and found to improve system-wide bus voltage.