期刊
DISCRETE AND CONTINUOUS DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS-SERIES B
卷 21, 期 3, 页码 803-813出版社
AMER INST MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES-AIMS
DOI: 10.3934/dcdsb.2016.21.803
关键词
Evolutionary games on graphs; game theory; coexistence; equilibrium; cooperation
资金
- German Research Foundation (DFG) through the Cluster of Excellence, Center for Advancing Electronics Dresden (cfaed) [EXC 1056]
- Czech Science Foundation [15-00735S]
Cooperative behaviour is often accompanied by the incentives to defect, i.e., to reap the benefits of others' efforts without own contribution. We provide evidence that cooperation and defection can coexist under very broad conditions in the framework of evolutionary games on graphs under deterministic imitation dynamics. Namely, we show that for all graphs there exist coexistence equilibria for certain game-theoretical parameters. Similarly, for all relevant game-theoretical parameters there exists a graph yielding coexistence equilibria. Our proofs are constructive and robust with respect to various utility functions which can be considered. Finally, we briefly discuss bounds for the number of coexistence equilibria.
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