4.6 Article

Quality Disclosure Strategy under Customer Learning Opportunities

期刊

PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
卷 30, 期 4, 页码 1136-1153

出版社

WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/poms.13295

关键词

quality disclosure; anecdotal reasoning; customer learning; pricing strategy

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [71902018, 71831003]
  2. Scientific Research Funds Project of Education Department of Liaoning Province [LN2020Q40]
  3. Hong Kong Research Grants Council GRF project [11506818]
  4. City University of Hong Kong [9042268]
  5. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada [239336]
  6. Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada [250161]
  7. Theme-based research project [T32-102/14-N, T32-101/15-R]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This study examines how customer learning of experience goods affects a firm's quality disclosure strategy and other decisions. The incorporation of learning behavior significantly alters the optimal disclosure strategy. Overall, the change in the disclosure strategy impacts pricing decisions and suggests possible strategies for firms and policymakers.
For experience goods (products or services), given the uncertainty about their actual quality and the growing popularity of social media, potential customers nowadays depend on experiences of peers who have used the goods previously to learn about their quality. In this paper, we study how such customer learning affects a firm's (credible) quality disclosure strategy as well as other relevant decisions. To model such learning, we adopt the anecdotal reasoning framework, which we show to be rational and a special case of the Bayesian framework. There are two main insights that we glean from this study. First, we find that the incorporation of the learning behavior significantly alters the optimal disclosure strategy from its single threshold structure in the extant literature to a multi-threshold policy. Specifically, firms with high- or low-quality goods prefer not disclosing quality information in order to utilize the pricing flexibility that such a strategy affords; on the other hand, a medium-quality firm might disclose its quality level, even though this hinders its pricing flexibility, so that customers are confident about it when purchasing the product. Second, we show that the change in the disclosure strategy impacts the optimal pricing decision, which can be non-monotone in the quality level. Our results suggest that when disclosure is expensive, high-quality firms are better off educating potential customers through advertising or social media, rather than disclosing their quality levels. They also suggest to policymakers that mandatory quality disclosure may not be socially optimal as more customers obtain quality information through peer learning. Our findings are robust and hold true under quite general customer valuation distributions, in capacitated settings and even when price can be used as a signal of quality level by firms.

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