4.7 Article

EPR system based on a reward and punishment mechanism: Producer-led product recycling channels

期刊

WASTE MANAGEMENT
卷 103, 期 -, 页码 198-207

出版社

PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.wasman.2019.12.034

关键词

Extended producer responsibility (EPR); Reward and punishment mechanism; Evolutionary game; Stackelberg game; Reverse supply chain

资金

  1. National Science Foundation of China [71802025]
  2. Ministry of Education of Humanities and Social Science project [17YJC630107]
  3. Diligence and Talent Project [QXTCPC201706]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

The discussion level of green development is constantly and exponentially growing, and the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system has become an important choice for the sustainable development of enterprises. To effectively manage the recycling of waste goods, this study uses the evolutionary game model to analyse the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism for the implementation of the EPR system and builds a producer-led reverse closed-loop supply chain model under effective conditions. Then, we compare and analyse the channel selection of producers in carrying out the reverse supply chain under the different mechanisms of rewards and punishments. The findings are as follows. (1) The choice of producers regarding the implementation of the EPR system is affected by the reward and punishment mechanism. (2) Through the comparison of different models of recycling channels, it is found that producer-led independent recycling channels have the highest efficiency. (3) The producer will choose either the entrusted distributor recycling channels or entrusted third-party recycling channels, according to the different rewards and punishments. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.7
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据