期刊
WASTE MANAGEMENT
卷 103, 期 -, 页码 198-207出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.wasman.2019.12.034
关键词
Extended producer responsibility (EPR); Reward and punishment mechanism; Evolutionary game; Stackelberg game; Reverse supply chain
资金
- National Science Foundation of China [71802025]
- Ministry of Education of Humanities and Social Science project [17YJC630107]
- Diligence and Talent Project [QXTCPC201706]
The discussion level of green development is constantly and exponentially growing, and the extended producer responsibility (EPR) system has become an important choice for the sustainable development of enterprises. To effectively manage the recycling of waste goods, this study uses the evolutionary game model to analyse the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism for the implementation of the EPR system and builds a producer-led reverse closed-loop supply chain model under effective conditions. Then, we compare and analyse the channel selection of producers in carrying out the reverse supply chain under the different mechanisms of rewards and punishments. The findings are as follows. (1) The choice of producers regarding the implementation of the EPR system is affected by the reward and punishment mechanism. (2) Through the comparison of different models of recycling channels, it is found that producer-led independent recycling channels have the highest efficiency. (3) The producer will choose either the entrusted distributor recycling channels or entrusted third-party recycling channels, according to the different rewards and punishments. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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