期刊
AUTOMATICA
卷 111, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2019.108576
关键词
Dynamic networks; Pinning control; Cyber security; Stackelberg games
资金
- NSFC, China [61890924, 61503027]
- NSERC, Canada
In this paper, we consider a secure problem in dynamic networks. A malicious attacker may attack the pinning controlled nodes and prevent the synchronization in the network. The network defender needs to secure the nodes with limited protective budget and increase the difficulties for launching attacks, while the attacker needs to decide the target nodes to attack. A resource allocation model for the defender and the malicious attacker is developed. A leader-follower Stackelberg game framework is proposed to study the behavior of both sides and the equilibrium of this security game is investigated. Numerical examples and simulations are presented to illustrate the main results. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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