Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma

标题
Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
作者
关键词
Cooperation, Punishment, Monitoring, Reporting, Common resource
出版物
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION
Volume 347, Issue -, Pages 334-341
出版商
Elsevier BV
发表日期
2018-11-23
DOI
10.1016/j.amc.2018.11.029

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