4.6 Article

String theory, non-empirical theory assessment, and the context of pursuit

期刊

SYNTHESE
卷 198, 期 SUPPL 16, 页码 3671-3699

出版社

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-01987-9

关键词

String theory; Scientific method; Explanation; Context of justification; Context of pursuit; Bayesianism

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This paper analyzes the radical disagreement over the adequacy of string theory, attributing the controversy to a failure to properly distinguish between the context of justification and the context of pursuit. Some explain the prominence of string theory as a result of a methodological revolution, while others see it as a case of science gone awry. The author argues that a clear distinction between these contexts is needed to resolve the current controversy in fundamental physics.
In this paper, I offer an analysis of the radical disagreement over the adequacy of string theory. The prominence of string theory despite its notorious lack of empirical support is sometimes explained as a troubling case of science gone awry, driven largely by sociological mechanisms such as groupthink (e.g. Smolin in The trouble with physics, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 2006). Others, such as Dawid (String theory and the scientific method, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), explain the controversy by positing a methodological revolution of sorts, according to which string theorists have quietly turned to non-empirical methods of theory assessment given the technological inability to directly test the theory. The appropriate response, according to Dawid, is to acknowledge this development and widen the canons of acceptable scientific methods. As I'll argue, however, the current situation in fundamental physics does not require either of these responses. Rather, as I'll suggest, much of the controversy stems from a failure to properly distinguish the context of justification from the context of pursuit. Both those who accuse string theorists of betraying the scientific method and those who advocate an enlarged conception of scientific methodology objectionably conflate epistemic justification with judgements of pursuit-worthiness. Once we get clear about this distinction and about the different norms governing the two contexts, the current situation in fundamental physics becomes much less puzzling. After defending this diagnosis of the controversy, I'll show how the argument patterns that have been posited by Dawid as constituting an emergent methodological revolution in science are better off if reworked as arguments belonging to the context of pursuit.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.6
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据