期刊
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
卷 115, 期 48, 页码 12241-12246出版社
NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1810565115
关键词
cooperation; indirect reciprocity; social norms; evolutionary game theory
资金
- European Research Council Start Grant [279307]
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [P23499-N23]
- FWF Nationale Forschungsnetzerke Grant [S11407-N23]
- Office of Naval Research Grant [N00014-16-1-2914]
- John Templeton Foundation
- ISTFELLOW program
- European Research Council (ERC) [279307] Funding Source: European Research Council (ERC)
Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other's reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These leading-eight strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.
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