期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID
卷 6, 期 3, 页码 1323-1331出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2014.2373401
关键词
Aggregator; correlated equilibrium; demandside management (DSM); electric vehicle (EV) charging; mechanism design; Nash equilibrium; price of anarchy (PoA)
资金
- Department of Electrical Engineering, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong
- Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada
In the foreseeable future, power grids will be managed largely with demand-side management (DSM) programs. With the growing population of electric vehicles (EVs) and the emergence of aggregators, DSM will surely introduce more intense competition to the markets. Since EV charging produces a large amount of time-flexible load in power systems, competition of its management could become a major game. This paper first formulates the game of EV charging management to describe this major form of the future DSM competition and then studies three challenges inherent in it: 1) inefficiency of Nash equilibria; 2) the game of chicken; and 3) cheating on private information. It is found that a central regulator is required to prevent these drawbacks. Solutions are proposed and a central governing procedure is also presented. The notion of the game of EV charging management is compatible with DSM programs that are able to schedule load flexibly over multiple time periods.
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