期刊
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
卷 41, 期 3, 页码 253-259出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.009
关键词
Computation; Representational content; Cognitive capacities; Explanation
The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view (hereafter, 'computationalists') claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken: I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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