期刊
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
卷 118, 期 2, 页码 379-392出版社
AMER PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC
DOI: 10.1037/a0023010
关键词
learning; sampling; judgment biases; rational analysis
资金
- Stanford Graduate School
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Education
Recent research has argued that several well-known judgment biases may be due to biases in the available information sample rather than to biased information processing. Most of these sample-based explanations assume that decision makers are naive: They are not aware of the biases in the available information sample and do not correct for them. Here, we show that this naivety assumption is not necessary. Systematically biased judgments can emerge even when decision makers process available information perfectly and are also aware of how the information sample has been generated. Specifically, we develop a rational analysis of Denrell's (2005) experience sampling model, and we prove that when information search is interested rather than disinterested, even rational information sampling and processing can give rise to systematic patterns of errors in judgments. Our results illustrate that a tendency to favor alternatives for which outcome information is more accessible can be consistent with rational behavior. The model offers a rational explanation for behaviors that had previously been attributed to cognitive and motivational biases, such as the in-group bias or the tendency to prefer popular alternatives.
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