The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas

Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans

(2011) D. Baldassarri et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons

(2010) Karl Sigmund et al.   NATURE

Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare

(2010) R. Boyd et al.   SCIENCE

When does optional participation allow the evolution of cooperation?

(2009) S. Mathew et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment

(2008) Mayuko Nakamaru et al.   JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

Winners don’t punish

(2008) Anna Dreber et al.   NATURE

The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation

(2008) M. Egas et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

(2008) R. O'Gorman et al.   PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES

Antisocial Punishment Across Societies

(2008) B. Herrmann et al.   SCIENCE