期刊
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
卷 39, 期 5, 页码 390-396出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2011.06.011
关键词
Competition; Contracts; Game theory; Services; Congestion
资金
- National Science Foundation [CMMI-0620811, CNS-0644114, CCF-0832820]
In service industries with congestion effects, two very different contractual structures are commonly observed, depending on whether or not firms choose to offer a guaranteed service level. We analyze the impact of these choices on market outcomes in oligopolistic industries. Our results highlight how different contractual agreements change the intensity of price competition in service industries. Broadly speaking, we show that competition is intensified when firms choose to offer service level guarantees. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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