期刊
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 299, 期 -, 页码 144-151出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.07.030
关键词
Cooperation; Public goods game; Reward and punishment; Replicator equation; Adaptive dynamics
资金
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- National Basic Program (973) of the People's Republic of China [2007CB109107]
The one-shot public goods game is extended to include institutional incentives (i.e. reward and/or punishment) that are meant to promote cooperation. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes predict either partial or fully cooperative behavior in these extended multi-player games with a continuous strategy space. Furthermore, for some incentive schemes, multiple NE outcomes are shown to emerge. Stability of all these equilibria under standard evolutionary dynamics (i.e. the replicator equation and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics) is characterized. (c) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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