4.4 Article

Moral assessment in indirect reciprocity

期刊

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 299, 期 -, 页码 25-30

出版社

ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.024

关键词

Evolutionary game theory; Indirect reciprocity; Cooperation; Reputation

资金

  1. TECT [I 104-G15]
  2. Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [I 106] Funding Source: researchfish

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Indirect reciprocity is one of the mechanisms for cooperation, and seems to be of particular interest for the evolution of human societies. A large part is based on assessing reputations and acting accordingly. This paper gives a brief overview of different assessment rules for indirect reciprocity, and studies them by using evolutionary game dynamics. Even the simplest binary assessment rules lead to complex outcomes and require considerable cognitive abilities. (c) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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