期刊
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 299, 期 -, 页码 25-30出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.03.024
关键词
Evolutionary game theory; Indirect reciprocity; Cooperation; Reputation
资金
- TECT [I 104-G15]
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [I 106] Funding Source: researchfish
Indirect reciprocity is one of the mechanisms for cooperation, and seems to be of particular interest for the evolution of human societies. A large part is based on assessing reputations and acting accordingly. This paper gives a brief overview of different assessment rules for indirect reciprocity, and studies them by using evolutionary game dynamics. Even the simplest binary assessment rules lead to complex outcomes and require considerable cognitive abilities. (c) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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