期刊
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY
卷 63, 期 12, 页码 1731-1751出版社
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN LTD
DOI: 10.1057/jors.2011.111
关键词
pricing; slotting fee; composite pricing contract format; Stackelberg-dominant retailer; newsvendor product
资金
- Hong Kong Research Grants Council GRF [HKU 746208H, CityU 9041458]
'Slotting fee' (hereafter 'SF') is an upfront fee a 'supplier' is required to pay a retailer in order to have his product sold on the retailer's shelves. It is becoming increasingly common, but also widely reviled. This paper considers a newsvendor product whose expected demand is dependent on retail price and sales effort. The question we pose is: given that the Stackelberg-dominant retailer has to choose a pricing contract with which she transacts with the supplier, how would the supply-chain stakeholders fare when the retailer implements SF instead of another practical pricing contract? We show that, contradicting its negative public image, SF empowers the dominant retailer to specify contract terms that will benefit all the stakeholder-groups. That is, the supplier's and the retailer's profits are higher, the production workers are asked to produce more, and the consumers pay a lower retail price. We also propose a new 'composite' contract format that incorporates both the SF and 'buyback' features. This composite format empowers the retailer to provide even greater benefits to the supply-chain's stakeholders. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2012) 63, 1731-1751. doi:10.1057/jors.2011.111 Published online 14 March 2012
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