Correlation electromagnetic attack on PRESENT lightweight block cipher

作者

Nilupulee Gunathilake¹ , Owen Lo¹ , Ahmed Al-Dubai¹ , William Buchanan¹

1. Edinburgh Napier University

会议/活动

Scottish Informatics & Computer Science Alliance Research Conference 2021, September 2021 (虚拟会议)

海报摘要

Lightweight cryptography is a novel diversion from conventional cryptography that targets internet-of-things (IoT) platform due to resource constraints. In comparison, it offers smaller cryptographic primitives such as shorter key sizes, block sizes and lesser energy drainage. PRESENT is a promising lightweight block cipher to be included in IoT devices in the near future. Thus, the emphasis of this paper is on lightweight cryptology, and our investigation shows the unavailability of a correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) of it. Hence, in an effort to fill in this research gap, we opted to investigate the capabilities of CEMA against the PRESENT algorithm. This work aims to determine the probability of secret key leakage with a minimum number of electromagnetic (EM) waveforms possible. The process initially started from a simple EM analysis (SEMA) and gradually enhanced up to a CEMA. Our current results indicate a probability of leaking seven bytes of the key.

关键词

IoT, Lightweight cryptanalysis, Side-channel attacks, Electromagnetic side-channel analysis, Correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA)

研究领域

Computer and Information Science , Physics, Energy Engineering, Mathematics, Mechanical Engineering

参考文献

暂无数据

基金

1. School of Computing, Engineering & the Built Environment

补充材料

暂无数据

附加信息

利益冲突

No competing interests were disclosed.

数据可用性声明

The datasets generated during and / or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

知识共享许可协议

Copyright © 2023 Gunathilake et al. This is an open access work distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.